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Abstract
We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and
private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across house-
holds by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers
is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated
at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current
system.
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1 Introduction
In the year 2000, two U.S. states  California and Michigan  put proposals for large-
scale, statewide education vouchers on their ballots. Both proposals were soundly rejected
in statewide elections, with opposition at the ballot box in excess of 60 percent. These
two cases are the most well known in a string of electoral defeats involving vouchers. This
phenomenon is not limited to the United States; education voucher proposals of a scope
greater than that of an experimental level are rare in other countries as well.1 Instead,
the coexistence of public and private education seems to be the predominant institutional
arrangement (see James, 1987).
In this paper we examine the political support for or opposition to education vouchers.
Specically, we quantify the welfare gains and losses to households in di¤erent income classes
when we switch from the status quo to a uniform voucher regime. To illustrate our ndings,
we use the model of Epple and Romano (1996) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) as our
status quo education nance regime. In that model, both public and private schools coexist.
All households pay income taxes to fund public education, but they can opt out of public
education to attend a private school of their choice at their own cost. The funding level for
public education in this mixed public-private regime is determined by majority voting. We
compare the status quo against a uniform voucher economy similar to the one recommended
by Friedman (1962). In our voucher economy, the government collects taxes on income and
uses the tax revenue to nance education vouchers. Each school-age child receives the same
voucher amount. Unlike the status quo mix of public and private education, the government
does not provide education in our voucher economy; it only nances education. Given the
voucher amount each child receives, households determine the level of educational services
for their children. Some households use their after-tax income to supplement vouchers (and
reduce their expenditures on other goods), while others do not.
1West (1997) and Carnoy (1997) provide descriptions and di¤ering interpretations of these experiments.
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In our model, the uniform voucher regime provides households the option of topping
up,whereas the status quo does not. For a household whose allocation in the status quo
is such that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of education for other goods is greater
than the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) (i.e., for a relatively rich household), the
topping-up option might have positive value and, hence, might a¤ect the political support for
the status quo. However, poor households in our setup are typically faced with the opposite
situation where their MRS is less than the MRT and the topping-up option does not have
positive value. The number of households who are better o¤ with the topping-up option is
clearly important for the support for vouchers.
When we switch from the status quo to the uniform vouchers, the size of the pie (i.e.,
the tax rate) as well as the distribution of the pie changes. We rst isolate the e¤ect of
the distribution of the pie. We compare the two regimes by xing the size of the pie to be
the same as that in the status quo (by xing the tax rate at the status quo level). With
the same tax rate, the rich households who chose private education in the status quo would
be better o¤ since part of the cost of private education is o¤set by the voucher. The poor
households receive a smaller voucher than the educational expenditure in the status quo
since the tax revenues are distributed among all households in the uniform voucher regime
instead of among just those who chose public education in the status quo. Despite the
lower voucher amount some households could take advantage of the topping-up option in
the uniform voucher regime if the overall resources available to them are su¢ ciently large
and if their consumption-voucher bundle is such that their MRS is greater than the MRT.
Quantitatively, however, it turns out that the topping-up option does not make the poorer
households better o¤ relative to the status quo, either because the overall resources are not
su¢ ciently large or because their MRS is less than the MRT. Consequently, a majority of
households prefer the status quo to uniform vouchers.
To account for the change in the size of the pie due to the change in the education
nance regime, we calculate the majority voting equilibrium tax rate in the voucher regime.
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The uniform voucher regime yields a higher equilibrium tax rate relative to the status quo.
When we conduct an election between the status quo and uniform vouchers, we nd that the
uniform voucher regime is unable to garner a majority of the votes. The coalition opposed
to vouchers consists of the two ends of the income distribution, the rich and the poor.
Much of the political economy literature on education vouchers studies selective vouchers
given to those who choose private school (i.e., the rich). Examples of these types of analyses
include Rangazas (1995) and Hoyt and Lee (1998).2 The paper closest to our analysis here
is by Chen and West (2000). They study uniform vouchers as well as vouchers targeted at
the poor. Unlike Chen and West, we study how the political support for or opposition to
vouchers is distributed across income classes. Moreover, we quantify the size of the welfare
losses or gains.
The structure of our paper is the following. In Section 2, we present two stylized models 
one representing the status quo which has publicly provided education and private education
options and another representing the voucher regime where an education voucher is given
to everyone. In Section 3, we calibrate the status quo model to match features of the U.S.
data. We then conduct computational experiments to examine the popular support and
the distribution of welfare gains for the uniform voucher regime relative to the status quo.
Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A and
sensitivity analyses are in Appendix B.
2 Model
In this section, we briey review the mixed education model of Epple and Romano (1996) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998). We choose the mixed public-private regime as our status quo
since it is a good description of the current K-12 education system in the U.S. and in many
other countries. In this discrete choice regime, households can opt out of public education,
sending their children to private schools instead, albeit at their own cost.
2Other work on education vouchers includes Nechyba (1999, 2000), Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003,
2005), Ferreyra (2007), and Bearse, Glomm, and Ravikumar (2000).
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The economy is populated by a large number of households. We normalize the size of the
population to 1. Households di¤er only by income, y, which is endowed across households
according to the c.d.f. F (p.d.f. f); the p.d.f. is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable.
We label households by their income and refer to a household with income y as household
y.The support of F is R+ and mean income, Y , exceeds median income, ym.
Households derive utility from a numeraire consumption good c and education e. The
consumption good refers to all goods and services that the household prefers other than
education. The preferences of each household are represented by the CRRA utility function:
u (c; e) =
8><>:
1
1  (c
1  + e1 ) ;  > 0;  6= 1;  > 0;
ln c+  ln e;  = 1:
(1)
Theoretical results in Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 are valid for more general preferences. However,
the quantitative results in Section 3 rely on the CRRA functional form.
2.1 Mixed Public-Private Education Regime (Status Quo)
The government uses the tax revenues, Y , to provide educational services. All households
face a discrete choice: publicly provided education or private education. Households who
choose public education receive the same educational services, E = Y
N
; where N is the
proportion that chooses public education.
Households who opt out of publicly provided education have to pay the full cost of private
education. Expenditure on private education is specic to the household. The market for
e is assumed to be perfectly competitive with a large number of producers facing identical
technologies exhibiting constant marginal costs. We measure units of e so as to normalize
its price to one unit of consumption. Each household allocates the after-tax income to
consumption and educational services, that is,
e = (1  )y   c. (2)
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If household y chooses public education, the allocations and indirect utility are
c = (1  )y; e = E = Y
N
; (3)
V ( ; y;N j public) = 1
1  
(
(1  )1 y1  + 

Y
N
1 )
.
Choosing private education involves maximizing (1) subject to the constraint (2), with so-
lution and indirect utility, respectively, given by
c =
1
1 + 
1

(1  )y; e = 
1

1 + 
1

(1  )y;
V ( ; y j private) =
n
1 + 
1

o
1   (1  )
1 y1 .
A household chooses public education over private if and only if V ( ; y;N j public) 
V ( ; y j private). A critical income by exists such that all households with incomes below
(above) by choose public education (private education). The critical income by is a continuous
function of  and N . Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) show that there exists a unique N 2
(0; 1) that solves the consistency condition N = F (by) for all  2 (0; 1). Denote the xed
point as N ().
An equilibrium for this economy is an allocation across households, {c; e}, a critical
income, by, and aggregate outcomes {N;E; } that satisfy: (i) given E and  , the allocations
{c; e} and school choice are utility maximizing for all households, (ii) enrollment in public
education is N = F (by), (iii) the governments budget is balanced, and (iv) there does not
exist another tax rate  0 which beats  in majority voting.
The decisive voter (ySQd , where the superscript SQ refers to status quo) chooses public
education and his most preferred tax rate is the unique solution to
maxu

(1  ) ySQd ;
Y
N ()

:
For   1; the decisive voter is household ym. For  > 1; the decisive voter is dened by
F (yh)   F

ySQd

= 0:5, where yh is the income of the household that is just indi¤erent
between public and private education.
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2.2 Uniform Vouchers
In a uniform voucher regime each household receives the voucher amount v, so we can write
the government budget constraint as v = Y .3 Each household treats v and  as given and
chooses the pair (c; e) so as to maximize utility u (c; e) subject to the budget constraint
c+ e  (1  ) y + Y; c  (1  ) y: (4)
If the upper bound on consumption is binding for household y, then its choices are
c = (1  ) y; e = Y:
If the upper bound is not binding, then household y will supplement the voucher and its
optimal choices are
c =
1
1 + 
1

f(1  )y + Y g ; e = 
1

1 + 
1

f(1  )y + Y g :
For income distributions with support R+, there exist low-income households who do not
supplement their voucher and high-income households who do supplement their voucher.
An equilibrium for the uniform vouchers economy is an allocation (c; e) across households
and a public policy (v; ) satisfying: (i) Each households choice of (c; e) is individually
rational given public policy (v; ); (ii)  is a majority winner; and (iii) the government runs
a balanced budget; that is, v = Y .
Denote the decisive voter by yUd , where the superscript U refers to Uniform vouchers.
The proposition below describes the majority voting equilibrium.
Proposition 1. (i) Householdspreferences over  are single-peaked and there exists a ma-
jority voting equilibrium tax rate. (ii) If   1; then the decisive voter is household ym and
the majority preferred tax rate is given by
 (Y ) 
((1  ) ym) 
=
ym
Y
;
3As noted in the Introduction, vouchers are merely instruments used by the government to nance edu-
cation; the government does not directly provide education. In our model of vouchers, a schoolis similar
to a rmin the neoclassical model. Schools simply convert resources to educational services, so we do not
refer to publicor privateschools.
7
and if  > 1; then the decisive voter, yUd , is implicitly determined by 1 F (Y )+F
 
yUd

= 0:5;
and the majority preferred tax rate is given by
 (Y ) 
((1  ) yUd ) 
=
yUd
Y
:
3 Are Vouchers Electable?
In this section, we examine quantitatively whether uniform vouchers can garner a majority
of the votes compared with the status quo mixed public-private education regime. As noted
in the Introduction, the voucher regime o¤ers a topping-upoption, whereas the status quo
does not. We compare the status quo against uniform vouchers when the tax rate is xed at
the status quo level.
Given the same tax rate, each households constraint on consumption is identical in both
regimes: c  (1 )y. For the households who chose private education in the status quo, the
voucher regime o¤ers Y in education spending while the status quo o¤ers nothing. Thus,
such households (fraction 1 N of the population) are strictly better o¤in the voucher regime.
For the households who chose public education (N) in the status quo, the voucher amount
is less than the educational expenditure in the status quo. This is because the tax revenues
are distributed among all households in the uniform voucher regime, whereas in the status
quo only those who chose public education receive the tax revenues. One might conclude
then that all of N households would oppose the voucher regime in an election between status
quo and the vouchers. That would be correct, however, for only some of the N households.
For households at a consumption-voucher bundle where the MRS is less than the MRT, the
topping-up option has no value. (This is the case for relatively poor households.) These
households are constrained in their education spending and cannot move in the direction of
fewer educational services and more consumption (see Figure 1).
Even though the voucher amount is lower, some of the N households might be better o¤
if their consumption-voucher bundle is such that their MRS is greater than the MRT (see
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ec
(1-t)y
t Y t Y/N (1-t)y+t Y
MRS<MRT
Figure 1: Trade-o¤s for a poor household
Figure 2). Such households could use the topping-up option to increase educational services
by reducing their consumption, making themselves better o¤, provided the overall resources
available to them are su¢ ciently large. The topping-up option is benecial for the relatively
rich households.
The electability of vouchers then depends on how many households chose private educa-
tion in the status quo and how many among those that chose public education can use the
topping-up option to make themselves better o¤. This is a quantitative question.
In order to answer the question, we calibrate the status quo model to match certain
features of the U.S. data and then examine who gains and who loses when we switch to a
uniform voucher regime. Our status quo model is parsimonious: Other than the parameters
of F (y) that we take directly from the data on household income distribution, we have only
two preference parameters in (1),  and , to calibrate. To implement our quantitative
analysis, we assume a lognormal (m; s2) income distribution, following Epple and Romano
(1996). We choose m = 3:36 and s = 0:68 to match the mean and median incomes in the
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(1-t)y
t Y t Y/N (1-t)y+t Y
MRS>MRT
Figure 2: Trade-o¤s for a wealthy household who chooses public education in the status quo
U.S. household income distribution in 1989, measured in thousands of dollars. (Recall that
vouchers were defeated at the polls, for example, in California and Colorado in 1992 and
again in California and Michigan in 2000.) We choose  = 1:54 and  = 0:02 to match public
funding per public pupil of $4; 222 in the 1989 U.S. data (assuming 0:5 pupils per household)
and an implied price elasticity of demand for public education equal to  0:67. The values
of the calibrated parameters are presented in Table 1.
These values imply an equilibrium tax rate of 5:18 percent. They also imply that the
Parameters Variables Matched
m = 3:36
s = 0:68
Model U.S. Data
Median Income $28,789 $28,906
Mean Income $36,257 $36,250
 = 1:54
 = 0:02
Model U.S. Data
Public Education Expenditure
per Public Household
$2,126 $2,111
Implied Price Elasticity of
Demand for Public Education
-0.67 -0.67
Table 1: Calibrated values for model parameters
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bottom 88 percent of households choose public education and the top 12 percent opt out,
which is consistent with the school enrollment data.
3.1 Results
As noted earlier, in the voucher regime the tax revenues are distributed among all households
whereas in the status quo the tax revenues are distributed only among those who choose
public education. Thus, in our model, the bottom 88 percent receive less in vouchers than the
educational spending they received in the status quo and the top 12 percent (who had opted
out of public education) receive more than they did under the status quo. Clearly, the top 12
percent would favor vouchers. As we argued earlier, some of the bottom 88 percent would also
be in favor of vouchers. For households above the 68th percentile, the consumption-voucher
bundle is such that their MRS is greater than the MRT. The resources of these households
are su¢ ciently large to top up the vouchers and move to a better consumption-education
bundle as in Figure 2. Hence, the households between the 68th and 88th percentile favor
the voucher regime relative to the status quo.
Households below the 41st percentile in our model are constrained as illustrated in Figure
1. Their consumption is the same as that in the status quo but their educational services
are lower in the voucher regime. These households would favor the status quo.
Households between the 41st and 68th percentiles are not constrained and nd the
topping-up option valuable, but their overall resources are not large enough to achieve an
allocation superior to what they had in the status quo. Thus, the bottom 68 percent prefer
the status quo to the uniform vouchers.
Figure 3 illustrates educational services across households in both regimes. In the voucher
regime, households above the 41st income percentile top up the voucher by reducing their
consumption. Note that households above the 49th percentile consume more education
services even relative to the status quo. However, for households between the 41st and 68th
percentiles the optimal (c; e) bundle in the voucher regime does not yield a higher utility
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Figure 3: Educational services under status quo and uniform voucher regimes
relative to the allocation in the status quo.
Below we provide a welfare metric for the gains or losses to each household as we switch
from the status quo to the uniform voucher regime. Our metric ! is invariant to monotonic
transformations of the utility function and it solves
V SQ (y (1 + !)) = V U (y) ; (5)
where V SQ (y (1 + !)) denotes the utility that a household with income y (1 + !) receives
in the status quo regime and V U (y) indicates the utility that household y obtains in the
uniform voucher regime. The equivalent variation ! represents the income transfer, measured
in percent, that would make household y indi¤erent between the status quo and the uniform
voucher regimes. When ! is positive, household y would be worse o¤ in the status quo
without the compensating variation. The uniform voucher regime then represents a welfare
improvement from the households perspective and ! quanties the magnitude of the welfare
gain.
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of welfare gains across households. The welfare
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Figure 4: Welfare gains from switching to uniform vouchers with the status quo tax rate
losses to the households below the 68th percentile are less than roughly 1 percent of their
income, while some of the households above the 68th percentile gain as much as 3 percent.
The largest welfare gains from introducing vouchers accrue to those households who in the
status quo regime are just below the critical income level that separates public from private
school choosers. For these households, the one size ts all aspect of public education
in the status quo generates the largest deviations from the privately optimal education
expenditures and the vouchers allow them to undo these losses. For the top 12 percent of
the income distribution (the private school users in the status quo), the welfare gains decrease
with income. As the tax rate is xed, the voucher must enhance their welfare. However, as
income increases, the welfare gain relative to income decreases since the voucher is uniform.
3.1.1 Role of opting-out
Critical to our conclusion on the electability of vouchers is the opting-out feature in the status
quo. Suppose, instead, that the U.S. economy were modeled as a universal public education
regime, that is, the tax revenues are distributed equally across the whole population as
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public education and no one opt can out. Then, N = 1 and e = E = Y for all households.
(By construction, N = 1 is inconsistent with the observed enrollment in public and private
schools.) Given the same tax rate, the voucher amount for each household would be identical
to the education spending under universal education. However, household y in the universal
public education regime is stuck with the bundle c = (1   )y and e = Y , whereas in
the voucher regime, it has the option of increasing e and decreasing c subject to overall
resources of (1 )y+Y . Households for whom the option has positive value would strictly
prefer the voucher regime. Clearly, no household is worse o¤ in the voucher regime and
some households are better o¤. Hence, in an election between the universal public education
regime and uniform vouchers, the voucher regime would win.
The above argument does not hinge on the exact value of  and  or on the tax rate.
In fact, if we were to recalibrate the model as if the U.S. economy were a universal public
education regime, the equilibrium tax would be higher. In order to match the price elasticity
and public spending per household, we set  = 0:016 and  = 1:54. Household ys most
preferred tax rate solves
max
2[0;1]
1
1  

[(1  )y] 1  +  (Y )1 	 :
These preferences are single-peaked in  for all  and the majority voting equilibrium exis-
tence theorem in Black (1958) applies. Furthermore, the most preferred tax rate is monotonic
in income, so the median income household is the decisive voter for all . The equilibrium
tax rate in the universal public education regime is 5:82 percent. Again, if we x the tax rate
at 5:82 percent and distribute the revenues equally across households in the form of vouchers,
then the voucher regime would be preferred to the universal public education regime.
To summarize, even though the bottom 88 percent receive less in the uniform voucher
regime relative to the status quo mixed education regime, only the bottom 68 percent op-
pose the vouchers. Despite the topping-up option available with vouchers, a majority of
households prefer the status quo.4 If the status quo was not a mixed education regime but a
4In Appendix B, we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative preference parameters and income
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universal public education regime instead, then the voucher regime would win at the polls.
Two natural questions arise at this stage. First, since the top 32 percent of the income
distribution prefers the voucher regime relative to the status quo, vouchers might be electable
if the votes of high-income households carried a greater weightrelative to others. That is,
in contrast to the case where all households vote in the election, suppose that more high-
income households participate in the election relative to low-income households, as in the
data. In Subsection 3.2, we assign voting probabilities to the households, recalibrate the
model parameters, and examine whether the voucher regime defeats the status quo. Second,
since public schools are as e¢ cient as private schools in our status quo regime, there are
no e¢ ciency gains to eliminating public schools and nancing education through vouchers.
However, if private schools are more e¢ cient, then there could be gains (and more political
support) to nancing education via vouchers instead of providing education through public
schools. To assess any potential gains, we recalibrate the model in Subsection 3.3 with the
assumption that private schools are more e¢ cient than public schools. We then examine
whether a switch to a uniform voucher regime is preferred by a majority of households.
3.2 Incomplete Voter Participation
We use data from the 1990 Statistical Abstract of the United States to assign voting proba-
bilities. Table 2 displays voter participation by income quintile. Within quintiles, we assume
that the probability of voting is constant.
Income Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Proportion Voting 0.40 0.48 0.56 0.64 0.72
Table 2: Voter turnout by income quintile
We maintain the same income distribution parameters as in Table 1. We recalibrate 
and  to match the observed price elasticity for public education spending.5 With  = 1:5375
distribution parameters.
5Solving for equilibria in this case is identical to that where all households vote, except that the identity
of the decisive voter must be determined from the income distribution of the voting population instead of
that of the full population.
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Figure 5: Educational services with the status quo tax rate under partial voter turnout
and  = 0:0192 and incomplete voter participation, the equilibrium tax rate is 5:2 percent,
compared to 5:18 percent in the calibration under complete voter turnout. The implied
education spending per household choosing public education is $2; 110 and the price elasticity
is  0:67 (recall that in the data the corresponding numbers are $2; 111 and  0:67). For
these parameters, the enrollment in public education is 89 percent, so only 11 percent of the
households opt out.
We then x the tax rate at 5:2 percent and distribute the tax revenues as vouchers uni-
formly across all households. Figure 5 illustrates the educational services across households.
The topping-up option is now valuable to households above the 44th percentile, compared
to the 41st percentile under complete voter turnout. The educational services of households
above the 51st percentile exceed that in the status quo. Households below the 44th percentile
are constrained and their level of educational services is less than that in the status quo.
Figure 6 illustrates the welfare gains/losses across households. Even though the topping-
up option is valuable to households above the 44th percentile, households between the 44th
16
Figure 6: Welfare gains from switching to uniform vouchers with the status quo tax rate
under partial voter turnout
and 69th percentiles do not have enough resources to achieve an allocation superior to what
they had in the status quo. In an election between the status quo and the uniform voucher
regime, with incomplete voter participation, the former is preferred by more than 62 percent
of voting households. Incomplete voter participation increases voter support for vouchers by
only 6 percent, not enough to tilt the balance of support over the 50 percent hurdle. Thus,
despite the fact that higher-income households participate in the election at a disproportion-
ately greater rate than lower-income households, vouchers are defeated in the polls.
3.3 Higher E¢ ciency of Private Schools
The voucher might receive greater support if private schools were more e¢ cient than public
schools at delivering education services; see, for example, Hoxby (2000) and Epple and
Romano (2008). In this subsection, we change the educational services technology and
assume that a unit of tax revenue can be converted into one unit of public educational
services but can be converted into more than one unit of private educational services. This
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involves introducing a price for private school education of p < 1, so the budget for households
contemplating private education will change from (2) to
c+ pe = (1  )y.
The allocations for households choosing public education are unchanged and given by equa-
tion (3), while the optimal allocations and indirect utility of households choosing the private
alternative are now given by
c =
p
1

p
1
 + p
1

(1  )y; e = 
1

p
1
 + p
1

(1  )y;
V ( ; y j private) =
n
p
1
 + p
1

o
p (1  ) (1  )
1 y1 .
The lower price on private education implies that the marginal household who was indi¤erent
between the public and private schools will now choose private education, so the enrollment
in public schools will be lower, all else constant. Of course, the equilibrium tax rate will
change as a result of the changes in the householdsschool choices.
The uniform voucher proposal is similar to that outlined in Section 2.2, with a budget
constraint reecting the assumed e¢ ciency gains
c+ pe = (1  ) y + Y; c  (1  ) y:
In the voucher regime, each dollar translates into higher educational services for both con-
strained and unconstrained households. For instance, the allocations for the constrained
households are c = (1  )y; e = Y
p
, and the allocations for the unconstrained households
are
c =
p
1

p
1
 + p
1

f(1  )y + Y g ; e = 
1

p
1
 + p
1

f(1  )y + Y g :
In order to study the e¤ects of these potential e¢ ciency gains we need to recalibrate
the model. Based on the evidence in Hoxby (2000) on relative e¢ ciencies of public and
private schools in the United States, we set p = 0:98 (the same value is also used by Epple
and Romano, 2008). We retain the same income distribution parameters as in our earlier
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Figure 7: Educational services with the private sector more e¢ cient relative to the public
sector
calibration (m = 3:36 and s = 0:68, see Table 1), but we recalibrate  and  to deliver the
price elasticity of demand and public education expenditures per household in public schools.
The resulting parameters are  = 1:5395 and  = 0:0202. With these parameter values,
the equilibrium tax rate is 5:12 percent, the public education expenditure per household is
$2; 110, and the public education enrollment is 88 percent.
Fixing the tax rate at 5:12 percent in the voucher regime, the results are qualitatively
unchanged and summarized in Figures 7 and 8.
As might be expected, the introduction of private school e¢ ciency provides additional
support for vouchers; 33:3 percent support the voucher in contrast to 32 percent in the
benchmark model where the private and public schools were equally e¢ cient. In terms of
welfare gains, the bottom 67 percent of households are worse o¤with vouchers when private
schools are more e¢ cient. Thus, while empirically plausible e¢ ciency di¤erentials provide
a small boost of support for vouchers, they are insu¢ cient to overturn the electoral defeat
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Figure 8: Welfare gains from switching to a uniform regime when the private sector is more
e¢ cient relative to the public sector
of vouchers. Clearly, as the e¢ ciency di¤erential increases, the support for vouchers will
increase as well.
4 Political Support for Vouchers with Endogenous Tax
In the previous section, we held the size of the education spending pie xed, but distributed
the pie di¤erently when we switched from the status quo to the uniform vouchers. The
critique by Lucas (1976) would suggest that we should endogenize the tax rate in the voucher
regime and then compare with the status quo. Put di¤erently, the decisive household in our
model might favor the voucher regime if it accounted for the change in the size of the pie
due to the change in the education regime. We examine this possibility below.
The parameters of the status quo are the same as in Table 1, so the majority voting
equilibrium tax rate under status quo remains 5:18 percent. Using part (ii) of Proposition
1 to determine the majority voting equilibrium in the uniform voucher regime, we obtain a
tax rate of 5:34 percent. Thus, the size of the pie in the uniform voucher regime is larger.
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Figure 9: Educational services with endogenous taxes under status quo and uniform voucher
regimes
The voting equilibria in both the status quo and the uniform voucher regimes are the ends
against the middle equilibria. In the voucher regime, the tax revenue is distributed over
more households than in the status quo and as a consequence, all those voting for nonzero
taxes vote for a higher tax in the voucher regime. The result is a higher equilibrium tax rate
in the voucher regime.
Despite the larger pie, each household receives a voucher less than the public education
spending in the status quo ($1; 936 versus $2; 126), since the (larger) pie is now distributed
among all households instead of just the 88 percent in status quo. Households who are con-
strained in the voucher regime (as in Figure 1) are clearly worse o¤ since their consumption
is less relative to the status quo (due to a higher tax rate) and their educational services are
less (due to a lower voucher amount). Figure 9 illustrates the educational services across
households. The constrained group constitutes all households below the the 43rd income
percentile that choose not to supplement the voucher.
For households between the 43rd and 68th percentiles, their optimal (c; e) bundle is not
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Figure 10: Welfare gains from switching to uniform vouchers with endogenous tax rate
superior to that in the status quo even though they top up the voucher amount by reducing
consumption. The lower tax rate in the status quo suggests that households choosing private
education might prefer the status quo, but the uniform voucher regime o¤ers $1; 936 to these
households, whereas the status quo o¤ers zero. However, the higher after-tax income in the
status quo more than o¤sets the voucher amount for the very rich households (above the
99th percentile), so these households are strictly better o¤ in the status quo. As a result,
more than 68 percent of households prefer the status quo to the uniform voucher regime.
Figure 10 depicts the gains and losses to various households.
Note that while only the top 12 percent choose private education in the status quo,
almost the entire top 32 percent prefer the higher tax and the uniform voucher since they
can supplement the voucher and attain higher utility.
As in the exogenous tax rate case, the opting-out feature is crucial for the electoral defeat
of uniform vouchers in the endogenous tax rate case. If instead of allowing the private school
option, public education were universally required, the calibrated parameters in Subsection
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3.1.1 would imply that the uniform voucher regime has an equilibrium tax rate of 4:52
percent and a voucher amount of $1; 639 per household. In a pairwise election between the
universal public education regime and the voucher regime, the voucher regime is supported
by the bottom 29 percent and the top 37:5 percent of the income distribution. Thus, uniform
vouchers will not su¤er an electoral defeat against a universal public education regime.
Partial voter turnout, as in Table 2, does not alter the result that the voucher regime
is defeated at the polls. With partial voter turnout, the tax rate in the status quo is 5:2
percent (see Subsection 3.2) and the tax rate in the uniform voucher regime is 4:74 percent.
The voucher amount is clearly less than the spending per public education household in
the status quo ($1; 719 versus $2; 110). In an election between the status quo and uniform
vouchers, the status quo again emerges as the winner, with the poorest 62 percent of voting
households supporting it.
Endogenizing the voucher tax rate under the assumption of higher private school e¢ ciency
does not qualitatively change the result either. Using the setup from Subsection 3.3, the
equilibrium tax rate in the uniform voucher regime is 5:28 percent with a voucher value of
$1; 914. Political support for the voucher regime is virtually unchanged with only the top
33 percent of the income distribution supporting it. Overall, endogenizing the tax rate does
not qualitatively change the support for the uniform voucher regime.
5 Concluding Remarks
We studied an environment where tax revenues are distributed uniformly across households
in the form of education vouchers. We calibrated the status quo mix of public and private
education to the U.S. data. When we distribute the status quo tax revenues as uniform
vouchers, the vouchers do not have a majority support to replace the status quo. Our result
is robust to a partial turnout in elections: even if richer households participate in elections
at a higher rate relative to poorer households, vouchers su¤er an electoral defeat. Our result
is also robust to an empirically plausible e¢ ciency di¤erential between public and private
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schools. Critical to the electoral defeat result is the opting-out feature in the status quo:
Rich households can opt out of public education altogether and send their children to private
schools.
Opposition to uniform vouchers in our model comes from most of the households who
choose public education in the status quo (opposition comprises the bottom 68 percent in
our benchmark calibration). This opposition could be overcome by distributing the status
quo tax revenues as vouchers to fewer households instead of distributing to all households.
For instance, in our benchmark calibration, the status quo tax revenues are available to 88
percent of households (the ones who chose public education), so distributing these revenues
as vouchers to only 50 percent of these households would clearly generate majority support
for vouchers. A more general approach to secure electoral victory for vouchers might be
to abandon uniform vouchers and use means-tested vouchers instead. This is the approach
we follow in related research. It is an open question whether majority-preferred policies on
means testing and tax rate beat the status quo.
We have not explicitly included housing in our model. First, to the extent that public
education is nanced by local property taxes, a switch to a voucher regime could a¤ect
property values and, hence, the tax revenues available to fund education vouchers. However,
the reliance of public education funding on local tax revenues has been declining in the
United States. For instance, in 2006-07, in 40 of the 50 states, nonlocal sources nanced
more than 50 percent of the expenditures on K-12 public education. When measured in
terms of student enrollment, 82 percent of the students enrolled in public schools were in
states where the nonlocal nancing is more than 50 percent (see Figure 11). Second, the
voucher regimes e¤ect on property values could a¤ect the political support for the regime;
see, for example, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003). Presumably the change in housing wealth
a¤ects the private consumption of housing services and other goods. Our model captures
the trade o¤ between a publicly provided good and all other private goods and services. The
private consumption good in our model implicitly includes housing services, so the e¤ect of
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Figure 11: The role of local nance by enrollment and across states in the U.S.
a switch to the voucher regime on private consumption of housing services and other goods
has been accounted for in the model. On the empirical front, Cooper (2009) shows that for
most households, changes in housing wealth have negligible e¤ects on consumption.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) All households with y > Y prefer a tax rate of  = 0 since
their tax payments, y, exceed the voucher amount. Furthermore, the indirect utility for
households is declining in  : To establish the single-peakedness for households with y  Y;
dene two functions V and V :
V (y; )  u ((1  ) y; Y ) ; V (y; )  u (c ((1  ) y + Y ) ; e ((1  ) y + Y )) ;
where the functions c and e describe interior solutions given resources (1  ) y+ Y and no
additional constraints. Clearly, V  V since the resource constraint is the same, but V has an
additional constraint on educational expenditure. Dene (y) such that V (y; ) = V (y; ) ;
that is, at  household ys interior choice of educational expenditure is exactly the same as
the voucher amount (or, the voucher constraint is just barely binding). It is easy to see that
there is a unique (y) (set (1  ) y = c ((1  ) y + Y ) and solve for ). Clearly, for a tax
rate higher than  , household y would be constrained. We can then write the indirect utility
of household y as
V (y; ) =

V (y; ) if  <  (y)
V (y; ) if    (y) : (6)
For household y < Y; V is increasing in  . For this household, it is also easy to see that V
is strictly concave in  : Thus, the indirect utility for household y, V (y; ), is (i) the same
as V (y; ) for  <  (y) and, hence, increasing and (ii) the same as V (y; ) for    (y)
and, hence, strictly concave. At  (y), by construction, V = V , so there is no discontinuity
in V (y; ) at  (y).
Now, V is single-peaked at b(y), where b(y) is the unique solution to
yu1 ((1  ) y; Y ) = Y u2 ((1  ) y; Y ) :
Furthermore, b(y) >  (y). This is because (i) at  =  (y), u1 ((1  ) y; Y ) = u2 ((1  ) y; Y )
since household ys optimal choice (based on V ) of consumption is exactly the after-tax in-
come and educational expenditure is exactly the voucher amount and (hence) (ii) @V
@

=(y)
=
u1 ((1   (y)) y;  (y)Y ) fY   yg > 0 for all y < Y .
Thus, V (y; ) is single-peaked for all households. Existence of a majority voting equilib-
rium follows from Black (1958).
(ii) We have already established that the most preferred tax rate of households with y > Y
is zero. Now, suppose that the decisive voter is not constrained. Then, u1 (c; e) = u2 (c; e)
where c < (1  )yUd and e > Y . Consider an increase in  : Then, the decisive voter would
be better o¤ with a higher  , as long as his choice of consumption is not constrained by his
after-tax income. Hence, his most preferred tax rate has to be such that bc = (1  b(yUd ))yUd
and be = b(yUd )Y: The most preferred tax rate solves the problem of maxu  (1  )yUd ; Y  :
(iii) b(y) is decreasing in y for  < 1, invariant to y for  = 1 and increasing in y for
 > 1: Hence, for   1, household ym is the decisive voter, whereas for  > 1 the decisive
voter is dened by 1  F (Y ) + F  yUd  = 0:5:
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Appendix B Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine whether our results in Section 3 are robust to alternative para-
meterizations about preferences and income distribution. We begin with di¤erent values for
the preference parameters  and  while maintaining the benchmark lognormal (3:36; 0:682)
income distribution. We consider three sets of values for (; ), each roughly matching public
education expenditure per household of $2; 111 and one of three implied price elasticities of
demand for education when evaluated at the mixed education regime equilibrium. These
values are displayed in Table 3, along with the results of elections between the status quo
and uniform vouchers. (The benchmark parameters  = 1:54 and  = 0:02 are also included
in the table for comparison.)
  Price Elasticity % Voting for vouchers
2.200 0.006 -0.500 40.3
1.540 0.020 -0.670 31.4
0.790 0.111 -1.250 25.4
0.650 0.155 -1.500 23.6
Table 3: Election results for alternative preference parameters
We now change the parameters of the income distribution while maintaining our bench-
mark preference parameter values of  = 1:54 and  = 0:02. Under the lognormal income
distribution, mean income is given by Y = exp (m+ s2=2). We x mean income at the
benchmark value Y = exp (3:36 + 0:682=2) ' 36:278 and perform mean-preserving spreads
of the income distribution using m = 3:36 + 0:682=2   2=2 for two di¤erent values of .
The di¤erent combinations of s and m in Table 4 imply the same mean income but di¤erent
median incomes. (As is well known for the lognormal distribution, inequality is increasing
in s.)
s m Median y Gini % Voting for vouchers
0.430 3.499 $33,072 0.239 35.5
0.680 3.360 $28,789 0.385 31.4
0.930 3.159 $23,540 0.489 30.2
Table 4: Election results for alternative income distribution parameters
We see that our principal ndings on the electability of vouchers in Section 3 are robust to
variations in income inequality. The uniform voucher regime is unable to garner a majority
of the votes against the status quo.
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